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Reputation Life Cycle: The Case of
Franchising
Uri Benoliel
Law-and-economics conventional analysis contends that franchise
termination laws, prohibiting opportunistic termination by the
franchisor, are superfluous.
Well-rooted in traditional law-andeconomics opposition to such legislation is the belief that the reputation
mechanism serves as a sufficient control against opportunistic
termination by franchisors.
This article questions the idea that
reputation concerns can be a substitute for regulation of franchise
relationships.
The article argues that the reputation mechanism suffers from an
inherent deficiency, which disqualifies it from serving as a substitute for
franchise termination legislation. In short, the reputation mechanism
often has a limited life cycle consisting of three stages: creation, erosion
and collapse. At the early stages of the franchisor organizational life
cycle, the reputation mechanism may have some deterring effects on the
franchisor. At these stages, the incentive of the franchisor is normally to
attract new franchisees and thus the franchisor attaches greater
importance to being perceived as fair in the eyes of potential franchisees.
As the franchisor’s financial resources increase, the effectiveness of the
reputation mechanism will be eroded. Particularly, the franchisor’s
incentive to attract new franchisees will decrease.
Similarly, its
incentive to maintain its present franchisees will decline. Instead, the
franchisor, having greater financial resources, will gradually shift
towards self-ownership of the units. Following the continuing decrease
in the franchisor’s financial constraints and the decrease in its incentive
to maintain and attract new franchisees, the reputation mechanism may
collapse. This may particularly occur when the reputation-related costs
decrease to a minimum level, at which point they will be lower than the
franchisor’s benefits from opportunistic termination of the franchise
contract.
Assistant Professor, Academic Center of Law & Business. J.S.D., University of
California, Berkeley, 2006; LL.M, Columbia University, 2005; LL.B., Hebrew University
of Jerusalem, 2003. This Article greatly benefited from comments and criticisms by Gary
Castrogiovanni, Richard Epstein, Tamar Frankel, Warren Grimes, Steven Michael,
Renana Peres, Yuval Procaccia, James White, and conference participants at the 2009
Israeli Law and Economics annual meeting. This article was presented at the 2009
annual conference of the Canadian Law and Economics Association (October 2009).
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INTRODUCTION
Legal economists have long debated whether the reputation
mechanism can serve as a substitute for regulating the behavior
of legal entities bound to a contractual relationship.1 If the
importance of maintaining a good reputation in the market can
effectively regulate or deter opportunistic behavior by the
parties, legal regulation of the contractual relationship is a social
waste. Conversely, if the market-based reputation mechanism
cannot deter opportunism, regulation of the relationship is more
justifiable. Traditional law-and-economics analysis, which has
found its way into current legislative practices in the United
States, tends to suggest that the reputation mechanism can
indeed function as an effective substitute for costly regulation of
contractual relationships.2
One commercial relationship in
particular—the franchise relationship—is well-positioned, say
legal economists, to be governed by reputation rather than by
regulation.
The franchise relationship involves two major legal entities:
the franchisor provides its trademark or trade name and a
business system, while the franchisee generally pays the
franchisor an ongoing royalty and an initial fee.3 To date, the
legal ties of franchise relationships are regulated by a minority of
fifteen states in the United States. These states enacted
termination laws requiring ‘‘good cause’’ for the termination of a
franchise contract by a franchisor,4 generally defined as the

1 See Gillian K. Hadfield, Problematic Relations: Franchising and the Law of
Incomplete Contracts, 42 STAN. L. REV. 927, 978 n.232 (1990).
2 See, e.g., Lewis A. Kornhauser, Reliance, Reputation, and Breach of Contract, 26
J.L. & ECON. 691, 703 (1983) (presenting a model in which “reputation will substitute
perfectly for a damage rule”);; DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, ROBERT H. GERTNER & RANDAL C.
PICKER, GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 57, 159–87 (1994) (suggesting that the reputation
mechanism “can bring about long-term cooperation even if there is no enforceable
contract”). But see STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, 323–
24 (2004) (arguing that the reputation mechanism is an imperfect substitute for courts).
3 The contract underlying the relationship between the two parties is the “franchise
contract.”
International Franchise Association, Frequently Asked Questions About
Franchising, http://www.franchise.org/industrysecondary.aspx?id=10008 (last visited Nov.
1, 2009). See generally Hadfield, supra note 1, at 931–32.
4 The fifteen ‘‘good cause’’ states are Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware,
Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Jersey, Virginia,
Washington, and Wisconsin. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-72-204 (2001); CAL. Bus. & PROF.
CODE § 20020 (Deering 2007); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-133f (West 2007); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 6, § 2552(a) (2005); HAW. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 482E-6(2)(H) (LexisNexis 2009); 815
IL.L. COMP. STAT. ANN. 705/19 (West 2008); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-2-2.7-1(1)(7) (West
2005); IOWA CODE ANN. § 523H.7(1) (West 2007); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 445.1527(27)(c) (West 2002); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 80C.14(3)(b) (West 2009); NEB. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 87-404 (LexisNexis 2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:10-5 (West 2001); VA. CODE
ANN. § 13.1-564 (2006); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.100.180(2)(j) (West 1999); WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 135.03 (West 2009).
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franchisee’s failure to obey the franchise contract.5 Under these
laws, a franchisor who concludes the franchise contract without a
show of good cause must pay the franchisee damages.6 These
franchise termination laws aim to protect franchisees against
opportunistic treatment by franchisors, who inherently enjoy
greater bargaining power.7
They are designed to protect
franchisees from franchisors, who may terminate the franchise
contract and opportunistically appropriate the profitable outlet
developed by the franchisee.8 More specifically, an opportunistic
franchisor may terminate the contract of an efficient franchisee,
who fully complies with the franchise contract, in order to sell the
latter’s profitable unit to a new franchisee for higher franchise
fees.9 Alternatively, the franchisor can terminate the contract
and manage the successful unit himself.10
Conventional law-and-economics analysis proposes that
franchise termination laws, prohibiting opportunistic termination
by the franchisor, are superfluous.11 Deeply rooted in traditional
law-and-economics opposition to such laws is the belief that the

5 See ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-72-202(7)(A) (2001); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 20020
(Deering 2007); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-133f(a) (West 2007); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 482E-6(2)(H) (LexisNexis 2009); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 705/19(b) (West 2008); IND.
CODE ANN. § 23-2-2.7-1(1)(7) (West 2005); IOWA CODE ANN. § 523H.7(1) (West 2007);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.1527(27)(c) (West 2002); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 80C.14(3)(3)(b) (West 2009); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 87-402(8) (LexisNexis 2007); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 56:10-5 (West 2001); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.100.180(2)(j) (West 1999).
6 Recoverable damages may include the following: (1) a fraction of the franchisee’s
tangible assets used with respect to the terminated franchise, including sales outlets and
facilities, offices, warehouses, trucks, furnishings, equipment, and accessories; (2) loss of
goodwill; and (3) loss of profits. See generally ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-72-208(b) (2001); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-133g(a) (West 2007); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2553(c) (2005); 815
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 705/26 (West 2008); IOWA CODE ANN. § 523H.13 (West 2007);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 80C.17(1), (3) (West 2009); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 87-409 (LexisNexis
2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:10-10 (West 2001); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-571(a) (2006); WIS.
STAT. ANN. § 135.06 (West 2009).
7 VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-558 (2006); Geib v. Amoco Oil Co., 29 F.3d 1050, 1056 (6th
Cir. 1994); Wright-Moore Corp. v. Ricoh Corp., 908 F.2d 128, 135 (7th Cir. 1990); Kubis &
Perszyk Assocs. v. Sun Microsystems, Inc., 680 A.2d 618, 622 (N.J. 1996); Corp v. Atlantic
Richfield Co., 860 P.2d 1015, 1018 (Wash. 1993); Robert W. Emerson, Franchise Contract
Clauses and the Franchisor’s Duty of Care Toward Its Franchisees, 72 N.C. L. REV. 905,
926 (1994); Robert W. Emerson, Franchising and the Collective Rights of Franchisees, 43
VAND. L. REV. 1503, 1511 (1990).
8 Corp v. Atlantic Richfield, 860 P.2d at 1018; Robert W. Emerson, Franchise
Terminations: Legal Rights and Practical Effects When Franchisees Claim the Franchisor
Discriminates, 35 AM. BUS. L.J. 559, 564–65 (1998); Robert W. Emerson, Franchise
Selection and Retention: Discrimination Claims and Affirmative Action Programs, 40
ARIZ. L. REV. 511, 519 (1998); Jean Wegman Burns, Vertical Restraints, Efficiency, and
the Real World, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 597, 620–21 (1993).
9 ROGER D. BLAIR & FRANCINE LAFONTAINE, THE ECONOMICS OF FRANCHISING 271
(2005).
10 Id.
11 See Michael J. Lockerby, Franchise Termination Restrictions: A Guide for
Practitioners and Policy Makers, 30 ANTITRUST BULL. 791, 858–60, 866–71 (1985).
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reputation mechanism can serve as a sufficient control against
opportunistic termination by franchisors. Since the incentive of
franchisors is to maintain and attract franchisees, their
motivation is to uphold a reputation of fairness. Accordingly, out
of concern for their reputation, franchisors are not likely to
opportunistically terminate the franchise contract.12
This “conventional law-and-economics opposition to franchise
termination laws has been significantly influential in the
development of franchise law in general, as witnessed by state
and federal policy making.”13 Most states to date have refused to
regulate general franchise termination laws prohibiting
opportunistic termination of the franchise contract by the
franchisor.14 At the federal level, such statutes have also been
rejected.15 Yet legislators may be surprised to discover that the
theoretical basis for this law-and-economics opposition to
franchise termination laws is not quite as solid as one would
hope.
This article, therefore, calls into question the idea that
reputation can be a substitute for franchise termination laws.
The article argues that the reputation mechanism suffers from
an inherent deficiency, which disqualifies it from serving as a
substitute for franchise termination laws.
In short, the argument is as follows: The reputation
mechanism often has a limited life cycle consisting of three
stages: creation, erosion and collapse. At the earliest stage of the
franchisor’s organizational life cycle, the reputation mechanism
is created. Normally, in this initial phase, the franchisor’s
incentive is to maintain its previous franchisees and attract new
ones. The franchisor wishes to expand the market of its products
as rapidly as possible, but is financially limited and cannot
expand on its own. Given the initial need of the franchisor to
attract and maintain franchisees, the franchisor will be
compelled to act in a manner which appears fair to present and
prospective franchisees.
Opportunistic termination of the
franchise contract is therefore less likely to occur, as legal

See infra Part II.A.
Uri Benoliel, The Expectation of Continuity Effect and Franchise Termination
Laws: A Behavioral Perspective, 46 AM. BUS. L.J. 139, 141 (2009).
14 Since 1992, about thirty states have refused to regulate general franchise
termination laws. See James A. Brickley, Royalty Rates and Upfront Fees in Share
Contracts: Evidence from Franchising, 18 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 511, 518 (2002).
15 For example, in 1998 and 1999 the federal government failed to pass two bills that
would have made it unlawful for a franchisor to terminate a franchise contract without
good cause. See H.R. 4841, 105th Cong. (2nd Sess. 1998); H.R. 3308, 106th Cong. (1st
Sess. 1999).
12
13
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economists suggest, at the early stages of the franchisor’s
organizational life cycle.
However, following the creation of the reputation
mechanism, its effectiveness is likely to be eroded. Particularly,
as the franchisor’s financial condition improves, the effectiveness
of the reputation mechanism will steadily deteriorate. As the
franchisor’s financial resources increase, the franchisor will
gradually shift away from attracting and maintaining
franchisees towards operating, on its own, the present and
prospective outlets in its chain. This shift mainly derives from
the fact that the franchisor normally gains more profits from a
franchisor-owned unit than from a franchisee-owned unit. As a
result of this shift, the franchisor will be less concerned about
being perceived as fair by present and prospective franchisees,
which leads to the conclusion that termination without good
cause is more likely to occur at this stage.
Ultimately, the reputation mechanism may collapse.
Following the gradual increase in the franchisor’s financial
resources and the decrease in its incentive to maintain and
attract new franchisees, the reputation mechanism will
malfunction. The reputation-related costs will reach a minimum
level, which will be lower than the franchisor’s benefits from the
opportunistic termination of the franchise contract. When the
franchisor accumulates enough financial resources to operate the
whole franchise chain on its own, this outcome is to be expected.
At this final stage—and herein lies the crux of the argument—
the franchisor’s reputation costs incurred from being perceived as
unfair by present and prospective franchisees are likely to be
lower than the benefits from opportunistic termination.
Opportunistic termination therefore is likely to occur.
Part I of this article will provide theoretical context by
briefly reviewing the debate over the effectiveness of reputation
as a substitute for franchise termination laws. First, the
arguments in favor of the reputation mechanism, which underlie
the traditional law-and-economics disregard for franchise
termination laws, will be introduced. Second, I shall review the
scant manifestations of skepticism as to the effectiveness of
reputation in preventing opportunistic termination by
franchisors. Part II will demonstrate the intrinsic deficiency of
the reputation mechanism in preventing opportunism by the
franchisor, namely the reputation life-cycle. The three major
stages of the reputation life cycle will be presented—creation,
erosion and collapse—with an eye toward uncovering the Achilles
heel of the reputation mechanism. While this article focuses
predominantly on the (in)effectiveness of reputation in
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preventing opportunism in franchise relationships, I will
conclude by suggesting broader implications of my analysis for
the legal administration of other long-term commercial
relationships.
I. THE DEBATE OVER REPUTATION
A. Law-and-Economics Conventional Analysis
Legal economists oppose franchise laws that require
franchisors to demonstrate good cause for termination of a
franchise contract.16 Essential to legal economists’ resistance to
franchise termination laws is the argument that the marketbased reputation mechanism can function as a substitute for
regulation.17 More specifically, legal economists argue that the
reputation mechanism can prevent contract termination without
good cause, since such termination will impose reputation-related
costs on the franchisor.18 As Charles Goetz and Robert Scott
argue, franchisors will “incur substantial ‘goodwill’ losses if they
attempt to exploit a discretionary termination authority.”19
Legal economists furthermore specify the reputation-related
costs which will prevent termination without good cause.20 First,
a franchisor who terminates the contract without good cause will
encounter difficulties in retaining its other franchisees. The
franchisor, as Richard Epstein explains, “has incentives to act in

16 See generally James A. Brickley et al., The Economic Effects of Franchise
Termination Laws, 34 J.L. & ECON. 101, 103–09, 130 (1991); Benjamin Klein, The
Economics of Franchise Contracts, 2 J. CORP. FIN. 9, 30 (1995); Lockerby, supra note 11,
at 858–71. Cf. Richard A. Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J.L. &
ECON. 293, 314–15 (1975).
17 Another important argument that underlies legal economists’ resistance to
franchise termination laws is that a statutory “good cause” requirement will increase
franchisor termination costs and therefore tempt the franchisee to cheat or at least to free
ride. See Brickley et al., supra note 16, at 104; Epstein, supra note 16, at 314; Matthew
Ellman, Specificity Revisited: The Role of Cross-Investments, 22 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 234,
250 n.36 (2006); Richard L. Smith II, Franchise Regulation: An Economic Analysis of
State Restrictions on Automobile Distribution, 25 J.L. & ECON. 125, 136 (1982). For a
critical analysis of this argument, see generally Benoliel, supra note 13 (arguing that a
statutory good cause requirement will enhance joint action, expression of trust, and fair
treatment of both contractual parties).
18 Lockerby, supra note 11, at 860.
19 Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L.
REV. 1089, 1148 (1981). See also James A. Brickely, Sanjog Misra & R. Lawrence Van
Horn, Contract Duration: Evidence from Franchising, 49 J. L. & ECON. 173, 178 (2006);
William L. Killion, One Person’s Sense of Justice Is Another’s Sense of Injustice, 24
FRANCHISE L.J. 3, 6 (2004); Alan J. Meese, Antitrust Balancing in a (Near) Coasean
World: The Case of Franchise Tying Contracts, 95 MICH. L. REV. 111, 131 n.96 (1996);
Daniel Clough, Law and Economics of Vertical Restraints in Australia, 25 MELB U. L.
REV. 551, 580 (2001).
20 Epstein, supra note 16, at 314–15; Benjamin Klein & Lester F. Saft, The Law and
Economics of Franchise Tying Contracts, 28 J. L. & ECON. 345, 356 (1985).
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a manner which . . . appears to be fair if he wishes to retain his
other franchisees.”21 Second, the franchisor will find it difficult
to sell additional franchise units to new franchisees.
As
Benjamin Klein & Lester Saft explain, “[t]he franchisor is not
likely to terminate franchisees merely to confiscate their sunk
investments opportunistically because franchisors must be
concerned about their reputations when attempting to sell
additional franchise locations.”22
Law-and-economics scholars, therefore, uniformly base their
analysis upon the implicit assumption that franchisors have a
static incentive: to retain their franchisees and to attract new
ones.
This assumption, however, is dubious, as will be
demonstrated in this article.
B. Skepticism about Reputation Effectiveness
A handful of legal scholars manifest skepticism about the
effectiveness of the reputation mechanism in controlling
opportunistic termination by franchisors. David Charny posed
one of the earlier challenges to the effectiveness of the reputation
mechanism, in his innovative article of the early 1990s.23 Charny
argues that the reputation mechanism will not function if the
21 Epstein, supra note 16, at 315.
See also Thomas M. Pitegoff, Franchise
Relationship Laws: A Minefield for Franchisors, 45 BUS. LAW. 289, 310 (1989); Smith,
supra note 17, at 130; Timothy J. Muris, Opportunistic Behavior and the Law of
Contracts, 65 MINN. L. REV. 521, 577 (1981); Boyd Allan Byers, Making a Case for Federal
Regulation of Franchise Terminations—A Return-of-Equity Approach, 19 J. CORP. L. 607,
651 (1994); Clough, supra note 19, at 580.
22 Benjamin Klein & Lester F. Saft, The Law and Economics of Franchise Tying
Contracts, 28 J.L. & ECON. 345, 356 (1985); Roger D. Blair & Francine Lafontaine,
Understanding the Economics of Franchising and the Laws That Regulate It, 26
FRANCHISE L.J. 55, 64 (2006) (“There may be lurking concern that franchisors may abuse
their ability to terminate franchise contracts in some opportunistic fashion. Although
there is some possibility of such opportunism, there is scant empirical support for it.
From an economic perspective, this is not surprising because most franchisors want to
expand, and it is hard to attract new franchisees while abusing incumbent franchisees.”);;
See also Epstein, supra note 16, at 315; Lockerby, supra note 11, at 859–60; Pitegoff,
supra note 21, at 310; Smith, supra note 17, at 130; Robert W. Emerson, Franchise
Terminations, supra note 8, at 586; Alan J. Meese, Regulation of Franchisor Opportunism
and Production of the Institutional Framework: Federal Monopoly or Competition
Between the States?, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 61, 68 (1999); Jonathan Klick et al.,
Incomplete Contracts and Opportunism in Franchising Arrangements: The Role of
Termination Clauses 16–17 (Am. L. & Econ. Ass’n Ann. Meetings, Working Paper No. 61,
2006), available at http://www.law.georgetown.edu/olin/papers/klick_paper.pdf; Jonathan
Klick et al., The Effect of Contract Regulation: The Case of Franchising 33 (Geo. Mason L.
& Econ. Res. Paper No. 07-03, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=951464; Henry
N. Butler & Barry D. Baysinger, Vertical Restraints of Trade As Contractual Integration:
A Synthesis of Relational Contracting Theory, Transaction-Cost Economics, and
Organization Theory, 32 EMORY L.J. 1009, 1092 (1983); Byers, supra note 21, at 651;
Clough, supra note 19, at 580; Muris, supra note 21, at 577; Killion, supra note 19, at 6.
23 David Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104 HARV. L.
REV. 373 (1990).
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franchisor ceases to use franchisees altogether.24 He suggests
that this may occur once the franchisor “has established a
market niche” or when the acquirer in a takeover puts in place a
new management team that decides to terminate existing
franchises.25
Skepticism about the potential for reputation to control
opportunistic termination by franchisors was also manifested in
a seminal article on franchise contracts by Gilliland Hadfield.26
First, Hadfield, similar to Charny, argues that the reputation
mechanism will not function if the franchisor stops selling
franchisees.27 She furthermore suggests that this may happen if
the franchisor reaches a limit on the number of the franchise
units it is able to sell.28 This limitation may often exist, she
maintains, as franchisors provide their franchisees with
territorial exclusivity.29 Hadfield’s second argument highlights
the problematic fact that the reputation mechanism depends
upon inferences, drawn by potential franchisees, about the
franchisor’s past behavior.30 She claims, “the interdependence,
the uncertainty, and the length of the relationship, as well as the
inexperience of the franchisee all make the identification of
franchisor opportunism very difficult.”31
Over the next few years, other scholars joined in the dispute
over the effectiveness of the reputation mechanism in the context
of franchising. Warren Grimes, for instance,32 argues that a
franchisor is likely to be less constrained by reputation concerns
in several circumstances. First, a franchisor is likely to be less
constrained by reputation concerns if a myth of high profitability
surrounds franchising or certain types of franchising.33 Second,
the reputation mechanism will be less effective if the franchisor
can counter reputation damage by lowering the franchise fee.34
Third, the reputation mechanism is less likely to operate as
expected if the franchisor can make less-informed franchisees the
target of opportunism.35 Fourth, the reputation mechanism’s
effectiveness is dubious if the franchisor has a short-term
Id. at 434.
Id. at 435.
Hadfield, supra note 1.
Id. at 978 n.232.
Id.
Id.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Warren S. Grimes, When Do Franchisors Have Market Power? Antitrust Remedies
for Franchisor Opportunism, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 105 (1996).
33 Id. at 130–31.
34 Id. at 131–33.
35 Id. at 133–34.
24
25
26
27
28
29
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perspective.36 Finally, the reputation mechanism will be less
effective if the franchisor misapprehends the extent of reputation
damage.37
While I agree with many of the scholarly objections leveled
at the reputation mechanism in the past, the next part of this
article contends that the reputation mechanism also suffers from
an inherent deficiency: its limited life cycle. The three major
stages of the reputation life cycle will be presented in
chronological order: creation, erosion and collapse. A detailed
analysis of the life cycle will reveal that the reputation
mechanism is often, by its very nature, doomed to failure.
II. REPUTATION LIFE CYCLE
A. Stage One: Creation
At the early stages of the franchisor organizational life cycle,
the reputation mechanism may have some deterring effects on
the franchisor; the franchisor may be particularly discouraged
from terminating a franchise contract without good cause. At
these early stages, the incentive of the franchisor is normally to
attract new franchisees (or other types of intermediaries, such as
dealers and distributors) and thus the franchisor attaches
greater importance on being perceived as fair in the eyes of
potential franchisees.38 The initial incentive to attract new
franchisees derives from three cumulative factors, which will be
explained in greater detail below. First, franchisors ordinarily
wish to rapidly expand the market for their products by opening
many pioneering outlets in various locations.39 Second, a young
franchisor normally lacks the significant financial resources
necessary to promptly expand the market on its own.40 Third,
new franchisees, attracted by the young franchisor, can
effectively support the franchisor in overcoming its initial
financial constraints.41

Id. at 134–35.
Id. at 135.
See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
Alfred R. Oxenfeldt & Anthony O. Kelly, Will Successful Franchise Systems
Ultimately Become Wholly-Owned Chains?, 44 J. RETAILING 69, 74 (1968–69). For a
detailed discussion on this first factor see infra notes 42–59.
40 Rajiv P. Dant et al., Ownership Redirection in Franchised Channels, 11 J. PUB.
POL’Y. & MKTG. 33, 34 (1992). For a detailed discussion on this second factor see infra
notes 60–72.
41 Scott A. Shane, Hybrid Organizational Arrangements and Their Implications for
Firm Growth and Survival: A Study of New Franchisors, 39 ACAD. MGMT. J. 216, 220
(1996) (describing the types of costs saved by the franchisor). For a detailed discussion on
this third factor see infra notes 73–105.
36
37
38
39
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Franchisors generally hope to quickly expand the market for
their products by opening many pioneering outlets in various
locations.42
Swift expansion generates several benefits for
franchisors. First, a franchisor, entering the market early can
snag superior geographic locations before the market becomes
saturated by competitors.43 A franchisor who quickly develops its
franchise system, on valuable real estate, may preempt its
competitors;44 followers will face difficulties in gaining possession
of the same valuable real estate, already held by the fast
franchisor.45 McDonald’s, for example, effectively preempted
precious real estate from its competitors, through favorable
leases.46 Through its early expansion in the relatively novel
sector of fast food, McDonald’s benefited from a first-move
advantage.47 In addition, a franchisor who quickly develops its
franchise system, may be able to lease or acquire assets in the
early stages of the market at prices below those that will prevail
in later stages, after the market has evolved.48
Rapid expansion not only gives franchisors an edge over
competitors, but also allows the franchisor to shape the market. 49
A franchisor that promptly expands the market for its products
may influence customer preferences.50 In the early stages of
many markets, consumers may not have a strong and precise
opinion about their preferred value of the new product
ingredients.51 They may also not have a strong inclination about
their preferred combination of the product features.52 For
example, when Coca Cola first penetrated the market, not many
customers had a predetermined preference for how carbonated or
sweet a cola should be.53 A successful early franchisor is likely to
have a seminal influence on the customers’ preferences regarding

Oxenfeldt & Kelly, supra note 39, at 74.
Victoria Bordonaba Juste et al., Franchise Firm Entry Time Influence on Longterm Survival, 37 INT’L J. RETAIL & DISTRIB. MGMT. 106, 109 (2009).
44 Oxenfeldt & Kelly, supra note 39, at 74; Steven C. Michael, First Mover Advantage
Through Franchising, 18 J. BUS. VENTURING 61, 65 (2003). See generally Marvin B.
Lieberman & David B. Montgomery, First-Mover Advantages, 9 STRAT. MGMT. J. 41, 44
(1988).
45 Michael, supra note 44, at 65. See generally Birger Wernerfelt, A Resource-based
View of the Firm, 5 STRAT. MGMT. J. 171, 173 (1984).
46 JOHN F. LOVE, MCDONALD’S: BEHIND THE ARCHES 164–65 (1986).
47 Michael, supra note 44, at 65.
48 Lieberman& Montgomery, supra note 44, at 44; Michael, supra note 44, at 65.
49 Gregory S. Carpenter & Kent Nakamoto, Consumer Preference Formation and
Pioneering Advantage, 26 J. MARK. RES. 285, 286 (1989).
50 Michael, supra note 44, at 66.
51 Carpenter & Nakamoto, supra note 49, at 286; Lieberman & Montgomery, supra
note 44, at 46.
52 Carpenter & Nakamoto, supra note 49, at 286.
53 Id.
42
43
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the value of the product features.54 A franchisor may also
influence customer preferences as to the combination of the
product features.55 Coca Cola, for example, may have critically
impacted the development of customers’ preferences for colas.56
The influence on customers’ preferences may ultimately shift
customers to favor the pioneer franchisor over later
competitors,57 leading to a market share benefit.
Rapid
expansion, therefore, is quite beneficial for franchisors.
Empirical studies confirm that swift expansion is advantageous.
Examining 137 U.S. franchisors in the restaurant industry,
Steven Michael found that a rapid expansion strategy of
franchisors leads to superior outlet share and ultimately to
higher profitability.58 Similarly, data covering 188 Spanish
franchise chains for an eight-year period show that an early
entry strategy of franchisors leads to lower failure risk.59
Nonetheless, despite the advantages, maneuvering an early
entrance into the franchise market is difficult.
A young
franchisor, wishing to rapidly expand the market for its products
on its own, normally lacks the significant financial resources
needed to fulfill its desire.60 Opening new outlets is often too
costly for a financially immature franchisor.61 Three significant
costs must normally be incurred by the young franchisor:
information costs, start-up costs, and management costs.62
To begin with, financial resources are required to gather
information regarding the local market in which the franchisor
may potentially expand.63 When a young franchisor system
expands beyond its original geographic location, it generally

Id.; Lieberman & Montgomery, supra note 44, at 46.
Carpenter & Nakamoto, supra note 49, at 286.
Id.; Lieberman & Montgomery, supra note 44, at 46.
For empirical support, see Carpenter & Nakamoto, supra note 49, at 286, 294;
Frank H. Alpert & Michael A. Kamins, An Empirical Investigation of Consumer Memory,
Attitude, and Perceptions toward Pioneer and Follower Brands, 59 J. MKTG. 34, 36–37, 41
(1995).
58 Michael, supra note 44, at 66–67, 69–71, 74.
See also Regis Coeurderoy &
Rodolphe Durand, Leveraging the Advantage of Early Entry: Proprietary Technologies
Versus Cost Leadership, 57 J. BUS. RES. 583, 584, 587, 589 (2004).
59 Juste et al., supra note 43, at 109, 112, 115.
60 Rajiv P. Dant et al., Ownership Redirection in Franchised Channels, 11 J. PUB.
POL’Y & MKTG. 33, 34 (1992); Richard E. Caves & William F. Murphy II, Franchising:
Firms, Markets, and Intangible Assets, 42 S. ECON. J. 572, 581 (1976); Francine
Lafontaine & Patrick J. Kaufmann, The Evolution of Ownership Patterns in Franchise
Systems, 70 J. RETAILING 97, 99 (1994).
61 Lafontaine & Kaufmann, supra note 60, at 99.
62 Rajiv P. Dant & Audhesh K. Paswan, The Effect of Financial Resource Availability
and System Size on Ownership Redirection in Franchised Channels of Distribution, 10
ASIA PAC. J. MKTG & LOGISTICS 85, 86 (1998).
63 Lafontaine & Kaufmann, supra note 60, at 99.
54
55
56
57
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lacks information regarding other local markets.64 Therefore, the
franchisor needs to invest capital in searching for and identifying
suitable locations.65 It should ideally also evaluate the local
market conditions of each potential location.66 More specifically,
the franchisor will have to invest resources in learning about
local marketing strategies, input suppliers, and customer
preferences, at each potential location.67 These informationgathering costs are likely to augment with increases in the
unfamiliarity, diversity, and uncertainty of local markets.68
The franchisor, wishing to expand on its own, will
furthermore incur considerable start-up costs in establishing
each outlet. The total start-up costs of each outlet can range
from $20,000, at a minimum, to over $1,000,000, depending on
the franchise chosen.69 Costs may involve renting or building an
outlet, stocking it with inventory and equipment, and advertising
it.70 Finally, a franchisor, ready and willing to promptly expand
on its own, will incur significant management costs. These costs
include the necessary capital needed to select skilled managers to
operate each outlet (selection costs).71
They also include
expenditures for monitoring the managers’ performance
(monitoring costs).72
Since expanding rapidly is usually too costly for a young
franchisor, its initial incentive will be to attract new
franchisees.73
New franchisees will normally be able to

64 Thomas Bürkle & Thorsten Posselt, Franchising as a Plural System: A Risk-Based
Explanation, 84 J. RETAILING 39, 41 (2008).
65 James G. Combs et al., A Strategic Groups Approach to the Franchising–
Performance Relationship, 19 J. BUS. VENTURING 877, 880 (2004).
66 Id.
67 Alanson P. Minkler, Why Firms Franchise: A Search Cost Theory, 148 J. INST.
THEORETICAL ECON. 240, 242 (1992).
68 Id. at 242–43.
69 International Franchise Association, Frequently Asked Questions About
Franchising, http://www.franchise.org/industrysecondary.aspx?id=10008 (last visited Nov.
12, 2009).
70 Justin G. Longenecker et al., SMALL BUSINESS MANAGEMENT: LAUNCHING AND
GROWING ENTREPRENEURIAL VENTURES 99–101 (14th ed. 2007).
71 See Shane, supra note 41, at 219; Seth W. Norton, An Empirical Look at
Franchising as an Organizational Form, 61 J. BUS. 197, 204 (1988); Combs et al., supra
note 65, at 880.
72 See Shane, supra note 41, at 219–20; Seth W. Norton, Franchising, Brand Name
Capital, and the Entrepreneurial Capacity Problem, 9 STRAT. MGMT. J. 105, 106 (1988);
James A. Brickley & Fredrick H. Dark, The Choice of Organizational Form: The Case of
Franchising, 18 J. FIN. ECON. 401, 403 (1987).
73 Rajiv P. Dant et al., supra note 60, at 34; Brent L. Baker & Rajiv P. Dant, Stable
Plural Forms in Franchise Systems: An Examination of the Evolution of Ownership
Redirection Research, in STRATEGY AND GOVERNANCE OF NETWORKS: COOPERATIVES,
FRANCHISING, AND STRATEGIC ALLIANCES 87, 92 (George Hendrikse et al. eds. 2008);
Shelby D. Hunt, The Trend Toward Company-Operated Units in Franchise Chains, 49 J.
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effectively assist the financially immature franchisor in
overcoming its initial economic constraints. To begin with,
franchisees often incur the information costs needed to find
suitable locations for expansion in locations which are unfamiliar
to the franchisor.74 Notably, franchisees are likely to have
valuable information regarding potential local markets, which
the youthful franchisor lacks.75 This is mainly because they
usually reside in the community in which the new unit is
planned to be established.76
In addition, franchisees will commonly incur the start-up
costs involved in establishing new outlets, including equipment,
inventory building, and real estate costs.77
Franchisees
furthermore reduce the management costs needed to operate an
outlet.78 First, they reduce the selection costs needed to recruit
qualified managers.79 Franchisees typically agree to invest
heavily in the outlet and to receive a residual claim on the
outlet’s uncertain profits.80 By doing so, franchisees signal their
management capabilities, compared to salaried managers, who
are willing to take the job.81 Second, franchisees reduce the
monitoring costs needed to scrutinize the performance of
managers.82 Since franchisees invest significant resources in the
outlet and have a residual claim on the outlet’s profit, they are
less likely than salaried managers, to put forth a suboptimal
effort level.83
Franchisees support the franchisor in overcoming its initial
financial constraints, not only by incurring and reducing
significant costs, but also by directly providing the franchisor
significant capital.84 First, if the franchise involves the sale of
products by the franchisor to the franchisee, the sale price will
usually comprise a mark-up over cost representing the
RETAILING 3, 4 (1973); Oxenfeldt & Kelly, supra note 39, at 71; Caves & Murphy, supra
note 60, at 581.
74 Combs et al., supra note 65, at 880. Sometimes, franchisors select the location,
but then they collect fees from franchisees for this service. Hadfield, supra note 1, at 936.
75 Bürkle & Posselt, supra note 64, at 41; Minkler, supra note 67, at 243; Anna
Watson et al., Retail Franchising: An Intellectual Capital Perspective, 12 J. RETAILING
CONSUMER SERVICES 25, 28 (2005).
76 Bürkle & Posselt, supra note 64, at 41; Combs et al., supra note 65, at 880;
Lafontaine & Kaufmann, supra note 60, at 99.
77 Lafontaine & Kaufmann, supra note 60, at 99.
78 Combs et al., supra note 65, at 880.
79 Shane, supra note 41, at 220.
80 Id. at 220; Norton, supra note 71, at 205; Combs et al., supra note 65, at 880.
81 Shane, supra note 41, at 220.
82 Id. at 219–21.
83 Brickley & Dark, supra note 72, at 404–05; Shane, supra note 41, at 221; Combs et
al., supra note 65, at 880; Watson et al., supra note 75, at 28.
84 Hadfield, supra note 1, at 935.
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franchisor’s return.85 In addition, each franchisee ordinarily pays
the franchisor an initial lump-sum fee, called a franchise fee86—
generally ranging between $10,000 and $30,000.87 Moreover,
each franchisee provides a constant and on-going stream of
capital to the franchisor, via royalty rates.88 Normally, royalty
rates are calculated as a percentage of sales revenues.89 The
average royalty rate paid in 2001 was 5.2%, which in real terms
translates to about $500 per month.90 Many franchisees also pay
the franchisor advertising fees,91 to support franchisors in
advertising their product or service regionally or nationally.92
These fees are most often a steady percentage, usually one to two
percent,93 of the franchisee’s monthly sales revenue.94 Finally,
franchisees occasionally pay fees to franchisors for bookkeeping
and management consultation services.95
Given the significant capital that franchisees provide to the
youthful franchisor, and their ability to support him in
overcoming its financial constraints,96 one would posit that the
initial incentive of the franchisor will be to attract franchisees.
This theoretical contention is, in fact, empirically supported.
Francine Lafontaine conducted a survey of, among other things,
franchisors’ motivation for using franchisees.97 The survey was

Id.
James G. Combs & David J. Ketchen, Jr., Can Capital Scarcity Help Agency
Theory Explain Franchising? Revisiting the Capital Scarcity Hypothesis, 42 ACAD. MGMT.
J. 196, 199 (1999); Lafontaine & Kaufmann, supra note 60, at 99; Hadfield, supra note 1,
at 935.
87 International Franchise Association, Frequently Asked Questions About
Franchising, http://www.franchise.org/industrysecondary.aspx?id=10008 (last visited Nov.
12, 2009). For statistics on the variation in franchise fees, see generally BLAIR &
LAFONTAINE, supra note 9, at 56–61.
88 Hadfield, supra note 1, at 935; Watson, supra note 75, at 25.
89 BLAIR & LAFONTAINE, supra note 9, at 62.
90 Id. at 67, 69.
91 Id. at 69.
92 Id.
93 Longenecker et al., supra note 70, at 100.
94 BLAIR & LAFONTAINE, supra note 9, at 69.
95 Hadfield, supra note 1, at 936. Notably, franchisors sometimes also obtain a
commission from approved suppliers of their new franchisees. Id.
96 But see P. H. Rubin, The Theory of the Firm and the Structure of the Franchise
Contract, 21 J. L. & ECON. 223, 225–26 (1978) (suggesting that passive investors, such as
stockholders, are a superior source of capital than franchisees).
However, for
explanations of why franchisees are in fact a superior source of capital than passive
investors, see, for example, Robert E. Martin & Robert T. Justis, Franchising, Liquidity
Constraints and Entry, 25 APPLIED ECON. 1269, 1271–72 (1993); Lafontaine & Kaufmann,
supra note 60, at 99; Francine Lafontaine, Agency Theory and Franchising: Some
Empirical Results, 23 RAND J. ECON. 263, 267 (1992).
97 Francine Lafontaine, How and Why do Franchisors Do What They Do: A Survey
Report, in FRANCHISING: PASSPORT FOR GROWTH & WORLD OF OPPORTUNITY,
PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIXTH CONFERENCE OF THE SOCIETY OF FRANCHISING (Patrick
Kaufmann ed. 1992).
85
86
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based on the answers given by 130 franchisors, all members of
the International Franchise Association, and involved in a
variety of businesses.98 The majority of the respondents began
franchising only recently.99 Franchisors participating in the
survey explained that they became involved in franchising
mainly because it allowed them to expand rapidly, especially
because franchisees provide capital to franchisors.100 In another
survey, conducted by Rajiv Dant, of 79 founders and
representatives of franchisors, similar results were found.101
Respondents were primarily drawn from the following
franchising sectors: fast food and restaurants, gifts and home
decorations, hospitality, convenience stores, and services.102 The
majority of respondents classified their business in the
introduction or growth stages of its life cycle,103 indicating the
relative youthfulness of the franchisors.104 According to the
survey, the most cited motivations for attracting franchisees
were “market entry and growth” and “capital access and
profits.”105
B. Stage Two: Erosion
As the franchisor’s financial resources increase, the
effectiveness of the reputation mechanism will erode.
Particularly, the franchisor’s incentive to attract new franchisees
will decrease.106 Similarly, its incentive to maintain its present
franchisees will decline.107
Instead, the franchisor, having
greater financial resources, will gradually shift towards owning
Id. at 2, 4.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 11.
Rajiv P. Dant, Motivation for Franchising: Rhetoric Versus Reality, 14 INT’L SMALL
BUS. J. 10 (1995).
102 Id. at 15.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 16.
105 Id. at 23. For further empirical support to the hypothesis that the initial incentive
of franchisors is to attract new franchisees due to financial constraints, see Lorelle
Frazer, Why Franchisors Discontinue Franchising but Continue Operating, 19 INT’L
SMALL BUS. J. 29, 32 (2001); David A. Kirby & Anna Watson, Overcoming the Financial
Constraints on Small Firm Growth: The Case of Franchising, 6 J. OF PRIVATE EQUITY 61,
63 (2003); Anne Marie Doherty, The Internationalization of Retailing: Factors Influencing
the Choice of Franchising as a Market Entry Strategy, 18 INT’L J. SERV. INDUS. MGMT.
184, 194 (2007); Scott Weaven & Carmel Herington, Factors Influencing Governance
Choice and Human Resource Management Within Services Franchising Networks, J.
MGMT. & ORG. 126, 132 (2007). For indirect empirical support, see Lafontaine &
Kaufmann, supra note 60, at 110 (“the fact that franchisors [examined in the study] that
were subsidiaries of larger corporations owned more of their own units, point toward the
idea that access to resources might constrain some firms to operate less units than they
would like.”).
106 Oxenfeldt & Kelly, supra note 39, at 75.
107 Id.
98
99
100
101
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the units himself.108 The franchisor will specifically want to
progressively open new outlets under franchisor-ownership,
which would have been opened as a franchisee-owned outlet,
when the franchisor lacked financial resources. In addition, the
franchisor’s motivation will be to gradually transform the
existing franchisee-owned outlets in his chain into franchisorowned outlets.
The shift in the franchisor’s incentive stems from the fact
that the profits that a franchisor can make, by owning a unit, are
normally greater than the profits it can amass through a
franchisee-owned unit.109 True, establishing and maintaining a
franchisor-owned unit is costly for the franchisor since it involves
information, start-up, and management costs. In addition, a
franchisee-owned unit provides the franchisor capital through a
lump-sum fee, franchise fees, and other fees.110 However, in the
long-run, a franchisor-owned unit is more profitable for the
franchisor than a franchisee-owned unit.111 With its companyowned and operated units, the franchisor continually keeps all of
the profits of the unit, whereas with franchised units its chief
source of profit is a lump-sum fee and ongoing fees computed as a
small percentage of the gross revenue.112
The superiority of franchisor-owned units over franchiseeowned units in generating franchisor’s profits is empirically
supported. For example, Thomas Ehrmann and Georg Spranger
examine the financials of seven large public U.S. restaurant
retail chains through their annual 10-k filings with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission.113 They examine each
franchisor’s gross margin ratios as well as the operating income
ratios for franchisor-owned to franchisee-owned units.114 For
each franchisor analyzed in the study, the single franchisor108 Id.; Rajiv P. Dant et al., What We Know About Ownership Redirection in
Franchising: A Meta-Analysis, 72 J. Retailing 429, 434 (1996); Caves & Murphy, supra
note 60, at 581; Gary J. Castrogiovanni et al., Shifting Imperatives: An Integrative View
of Resource Scarcity and Agency Reasons for Franchising, 30 ENTREPRENEURSHIP THEORY
& PRAC. 23, 25 (2006); Baker & Dant, supra note 73, at 92.
109 Baker & Dant, supra note 73, at 92.
110 See supra Part II.A.
111 Hunt, supra note 73, at 6–7; Hadfield, supra note 1, at 936–37; Paul Tracey &
Owen Jarvis, Toward a Theory of Social Venture Franchising, 31 ENTREPRENEURSHIP
THEORY & PRAC. 667, 669 (2007); James G. Combs et al., Franchising: A Review and
Avenues to Greater Theoretical Diversity, 30 J. MGMT. 907, 909–10 (2004).
112 Baker & Dant, supra note 73, at 92; James G. Combs & Gary J. Castrogiovanni,
Franchisor Strategy: A Proposed Model and Empirical Test of Franchise Versus Company
Ownership, 32 J. SMALL BUS. MGMT. 37, 38–39 (1994).
113 Thomas Ehrmann and Georg Spranger, Franchisee Versus Company Ownership—
An Empirical Analysis of Franchisor Profit, in ECONOMICS AND MANAGEMENT OF
NETWORKS 31, 39–40 (Gérard Cliquet et al., eds. 2007).
114 Id. at 40.
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owned unit added far more to both the gross margin and to the
total operating income than the single franchisee-owned unit.115
Similarly, Urban Ozanne and Shelby Hunt found that sales in
franchisor-owned outlets in the fast food industry are on average
significantly higher than those in franchisee-owned outlets.116
Anecdotal evidence bolsters the contention that franchisorowned units are superior to franchisee-owned units in generating
franchisor profits, as expressed in several classic statements by
franchisors. For example, John Jay Hooker famously stated:
As all of you know, the name of the game is not really franchising.
The name of the game is company stores. I was looking at some
figures not too long ago and saw where a big company in America has
1,600–1,700 units, and only two hundred of those were companyowned, but the two hundred company-owned units were producing
sixty percent of the net after taxes. . . the real name of the game is
owning the stores yourself.117

Similarly, Lawrence E. Singer, who was the president of Royal
Castle System Inc. has noted: “We make more profit, per unit,
than we could possibly make in franchising. This fact has been
acknowledged by many of the franchise operators.”118
Given the superiority of franchisor-owned units over
franchisee-owned units, the effectiveness of the reputation
mechanism is likely to be eroded when the franchisor’s financial
constraints decrease. As the resources needed for establishing
and operating units become more attainable by the franchisor,
forgoing the higher levels of profit attained through franchisor
ownership ceases to be necessary.119 Indeed, empirical studies
indicate that as the franchisor’s financial resources increase, the
reputation mechanism erodes.
These studies particularly
Id. at 41.
S. Select Comm. on Small Business, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., Report on the Economic
Effects of Franchising 87 (Comm. Print 1971) (written by Urban B. Ozanne & Shelby D.
Hunt); Hunt, supra note 73, at 7.
117 John Jay Hooker, The Story of Minnie Pearl—A Case History of One New
Company’s Trials, Tribulations and Triumphs, in FRANCHISING TODAY: REPORT ON THE
FIFTH INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE ON FRANCHISING 164, 171 (Charles L.
Vaughn ed. 1970).
118 Lawrence E. Singer, To Franchise or Not—How to Decide: Con—Why CompanyOwned Units, in FRANCHISING TODAY: 1966–1967 23, 24 (Charles L. Vaughn & David B.
Slater eds. 1967). Likewise, William Ware of PKI Foods, Inc., stated:
More profits can be gained from company-owned stores. A break-even analysis
of operations in the $225,000 to $300,000 range shows this fact to be very true.
Since our stores average $270,000 per unit per year and some clear between
$50,000 and $100,000, it becomes evident that our stores are more profitable
than if franchised.
William Ware, To Franchise or Not—How to Decide: Con—Why Company-Owned Units, in
FRANCHISING TODAY: 1966–1967 27, 29 (Charles L. Vaughn & David B. Slater eds. 1967).
119 Baker & Dant, supra note 73, at 92.
115
116
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confirm that as the financial availability of the franchisor
increases, its incentive will gradually shift away from attracting
new franchisees and maintaining the present ones, towards
owning prospective and present outlets.120 For example, Rajiv
Dant and Patrick Kaufmann examine the changes in ownership
patterns of franchise systems as the franchisor financially
matures.121 They utilize a national mail survey of the franchised
fast food restaurant industry franchisors, and analyze a total of
152 questionnaires filled out by franchisors.122 The questionnaire
asks the franchisor respondent to provide details of ownership
patterns, unit reacquisition activity, new units sale activity, and
franchisor’s resource availability position.123 The questionnaires
were most frequently completed by presidents, CEOs, or founders
of the franchise.124
The typical franchisor commenced its
operation in 1966, sold its first franchise in 1974, and had about
200 outlets.125 Dant and Kaufmann’s study confirms the validity
of the hypothesis that the greater the franchisor’s internal access
to financial, informational, and managerial resources, the more
likely the strategic tendency toward company ownership of
outlets.126 The strategic tendency toward company ownership of
outlets is measured by two factors. First, the inclination of
franchisors to substitute existing franchisee-owned outlets with
franchisor-owned outlets (retrospective substitution), was
considered.127 This inclination is captured mainly by comparing
(a) the number of franchisee-owned units reported by the
franchisor to have been permanently converted into franchisorowned units and (b) the number of franchisor-owned units
120 Notably, other contradicting empirical studies also examine the relationship
between the size and age of the franchisor and its ownership patterns. See, for example,
Hunt, supra note 73, at 9; Scott Shane, Explaining the Distribution of Franchised and
Company-Owned Outlets in Franchise Systems, 24 J. MGMT. 717, 724–25, 730, 735 (1998);
Gary J. Castrogiovanni et al., Resource Scarcity and Agency Theory Predictions
Concerning the Continued Use of Franchising in Multi-Outlet Networks, 44 J. SMALL BUS.
MGMT. 27, 30, 36–37 (2006); Lorelle Frazer, Causes of Disruption to Franchise Operations,
54 J. BUS. RES. 227, 229–30, 232 (2001); Lafontaine & Kaufmann, supra note 60, at 110;
Ilan Alon, The Use of Franchising by U.S.-Based Retailers, 39 J. SMALL BUS. MGMT. 111,
117 (2001); Combs & Castrogiovanni, supra note 112, at 45.
121 Rajiv P. Dant & Patrick J. Kaufmann, Structural and Strategic Dynamics in
Franchising, 79 J. RETAILING 63 (2003).
122 Id. at 67.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 68.
125 Id.
126 Id. at 72. For similar results and dataset, see Patrick J. Kaufmann & Rajiv P.
Dant, Multi-Unit Franchising: Growth and Management Issues, 11 J. BUS. VENTURING
343, 351, 354 (1996); Rajiv P. Dant & Patrick J. Kaufmann, Robert A. Robicheaux,
Changes in the Mix of Company-Owned and Franchised Outlets: Ownership Redirection
Revisited, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY OF FRANCHISING CONFERENCE
4, 13 (1998).
127 Dant & Kaufmann, supra note 121, at 67.
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reported by the franchisor to have been permanently converted
into franchisee-owned units.128 The strategic tendency toward
company ownership is furthermore measured by the propensity
of franchisors to open new outlets under franchisor-ownership
which would have been opened as a franchisee-owned outlet
earlier in the franchisor’s history (prospective substitution).129
This tendency is calculated by comparing (a) the current year’s
pattern of new units opening activity to (b) the pattern of
ownership as established by previous year’s composition of
franchisor-owned units versus franchisee-owned units.130
Empirical support for the erosion of the reputation
mechanism in several key industries was also established in a
study by Rajiv Dant and Audhesh Paswan. Dant and Paswan
culled data from successive volumes of Franchising in the
Economy to test, among other things, the shifts in ownership
patterns of franchise systems as the franchisor financially
matures,131 spanning the period of 1977 through 1986.132 They
find in the rentals (equipment) industry, as well as in the hotels,
motels and campground industry, that as the financial resource
availability of franchisor increases there will be greater incidence
of ownership redirection favoring the franchisor.133 Ownership
redirection, in this context, was captured by the inclination of
franchisors to substitute existing franchisee-owned outlets with
franchisor-owned outlets. This inclination is measured mainly by
comparing the number of franchisee-owned units converted to
franchisor-owned units with the number of franchisor-owned
units converted to franchisee-owned units.134
Another empirical study, conducted by James Combs and
David Ketchen, indicates that as the financial resources of the
franchisor increase, the reputation mechanism erodes.135 Combs
and Ketchen’s sample is drawn from the restaurant industry
during the years 1989 through 1993.136 Their study relies mainly
on franchisor’s annual reports and Compact Disclosure, a
comprehensive database of public firms.137 Examining data from
91 restaurant chains, Combs and Ketchen empirically confirm
the hypothesis that the less a franchisor encounters difficulties
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137

Id.
Id. at 67–68.
Id. at 68.
Dant & Paswan, supra note 62, at 90.
Id.
Id. at 93, 96, 99.
Id. at 93.
Combs et al., supra note 86, at 199.
Id.
Id. at 199, 201.
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stemming from a lack of capital, the less the franchisor will rely
on expansion through franchising as opposed to franchisor
ownership.138
C. Stage Three: Collapse
Following the continuing decrease in the franchisor’s
financial constraints and the decrease in its incentive to
maintain and attract new franchisees, the reputation mechanism
may collapse. This may particularly occur when the reputationrelated costs decrease to a minimum level, at which they will be
lower than the franchisor benefits from opportunistic termination
of the franchise contract. Such a low level is reached when the
franchisor accrues sufficient capital to manage the whole
franchise chain on its own. At this stage, the franchisor’s
reputation costs from being perceived as unjust by present and
prospective franchisees are likely to be lower than the benefits
from opportunistic termination. Termination without good cause
therefore is likely to occur.
An analysis of case law on dealership and distributorship
relationships, which are often governed by franchise termination
laws, arguably reveals the collapse of the reputation mechanism
that follows a gradual improvement in a franchisor’s financial
position. An early illustrative case is Kealey Pharmacy & Home
Care Servs. Inc. v. Walgreen Co.139 Between 1972 and 1979,
Walgreen sold a wide variety of drugs, beauty aids, and
household commodities to consumers through a nation-wide
system of both Walgreen-owned stores and dealers using the
Walgreen brand-name.140 The dealers independently owned
drugstores pursuant to a standard dealership agreement with
Walgreen.141 Throughout the contractual relationship between
Walgreen and its dealers, the dealers provided capital to
Walgreen in two chief ways.
First, the dealers paid for
merchandise which they purchased from Walgreen.142
In
addition, the dealers provided capital to Walgreen indirectly by
138 Combs et al., supra note 86, at 199, 202. For similar results and dataset, see Vera
L. Hoover, David J. Ketchen, Jr. & James G. Combs, Why Restaurant Firms Franchise:
An Analysis of Two Possible Explanations, 44 CORNELL HOTEL AND REST. ADMIN. Q. 9, 14
(2003); see also James G. Combs & David J. Ketchen, Jr., Explaining Interfirm
Cooperation and Performance: Toward a Reconciliation of Predictions from the ResourceBased View and Organizational Economics, 20 STRAT. MGMT. J. 867, 872, 880 (1999).
139 Kealey Pharmacy & Home Care Servs., Inc. v. Walgreen Co., 761 F.2d 345, 347
(7th Cir. 1985).
140 Kealey Pharmacy & Home Care Serv., Inc. v. Walgreen Co., 539 F. Supp. 1357,
1360–1361 (W.D. Wis. 1982), aff’d, 761 F.2d 345 (7th Cir. 1985).
141 Kealey Pharmacy & Home Care Servs., Inc., 761 F.2d, at 347.
142 Kealey Pharmacy & Home Care Serv., Inc. v. Walgreen Co., 607 F. Supp. 155, 158
(W.D. Wis. 1984), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 761 F.2d 345 (7th Cir. 1985).
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promoting the Walgreen name, image, and reputation in their
local communities.143 Arguably, Walgreen relied on these dealers
to provide the significant financial resouces needed to promote
Walgreen products, which Walgreen lacked at that stage. During
the contractual relationships of Walgreen with its dealers,
Walgreen’s net sales were almost constantly increasing.144 For
example, Walgreen’s net sales in 1972 were $863,334,000;145
whereas by 1979, Walgreen’s net sales had jumped to
$1,344,542,000.146 Figure 1 outlines Walgreen’s increase in net
sales between 1972 and 1979.

Figure 1: Walgreen’s Net Sales: 1972–1979 (in thousands)
In 1980, following the constant increase in Walgreen’s
annual net sales, it arguably reached a stage in its organizational
life cycle in which it had enough financial resources at its
disposal to operate all the stores on its own.147 Indeed, in that
year, Walgreen decided to adjust its marketing strategy. In
particular, Walgreen made a decision to cease its reliance on
dealers.148 Instead, Walgreen chose to maintain and increase its
own stores in the same geographic areas where the dealers had
already helped build up Walgreen’s reputation and image.149 At
this stage, the reputation mechanism collapsed. Walgreen was
no longer interested in relying on the financial resources
143 Kealey Pharmacy & Home Care Serv. Inc., 607 F. Supp. at 159. For example, all of
the prescription drugs that the dealers sold included the words “Walgreen Agency.” Id.
144 These are the annual net sales of Walgreen during 1972 and 1979 (in thousands):
$863,334 (1972), $930,898 (1973), $996,616 (1974), $1,079,143 (1975), $1,169,779 (1976),
$1,223,249 (1977), $1,192,855 (1978), $1,344,542 (1979). See WALGREEN CO., ANNUAL
REPORTS (1972–1979).
145 WALGREEN CO., 1972 ANNUAL REPORT (1972).
146 WALGREEN CO., 1979 ANNUAL REPORT (1979).
147 See generally WALGREEN CO., ANNUAL REPORTS (1972–1979); Kealey Pharmacy &
Home Care Servs., Inc. v. Walgreen Co., 761 F.2d 345, 347 (7th Cir. 1985).
148 Kealey Pharmacy & Home Care Servs. 761 F.2d at 350.
149 Id.
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provided by the dealers, and thus had no reason to fear a blow to
its reputation.150 Termination without good cause was likely to
occur. In fact, Walgreen terminated its dealership agreements
absent any showing that the dealers failed to comply with the
requirements imposed by Walgreen.151
Another important case which reveals the collapse of the
reputation mechanism following a gradual improvement in the
franchisor’s resource availability is Atlantic City Coin & Slot
Serv. Co. v. IGT.152 International Game Technology (IGT)
designs and manufactures electronic gaming devices.153 During
1983 and 1997 IGT expanded its products in New Jersey,
Maryland, and the Caribbeans using an exclusive distributor.154
Throughout the contractual relationship between the IGT and
the distributor, the latter provided significant financial
assistance to IGT.155 More specifically, the exclusive distributor
invested significant financial resources in promoting the IGT
name, expanding a sales force, expanding a marketing facility,
expanding a storage area for IGT products, and leasing
warehousing devoted to storing, testing, and servicing of IGT
gaming devices.156
Arguably, IGT relied on its exclusive
distributor since it could provide the significant resources
necessary to promote IGT products—resources which IGT lacked
at that early stage. Throughout its contractual relationship with
the exclusive distributor, IGT’s annual total revenues were
almost constantly increasing.157 For example, in 1983 IGT total
revenues were $60,032,000;158 whereas by 1997, IGT total
revenues had jumped to $743,970,000.159 Figure 2 demonstrates
graphically IGT’s increase in total revenues between 1983 and
1997.

150 See generally Combs et al., supra note 86 (discussing the deterioration of the
reputation mechanism that corresponds with an increase in financial resources).
151 Kealey Pharmacy & Home Care Servs., Inc. 761 F.2d at 350.
152 Atlantic City Coin & Slot Serv. Co. v. IGT, 14 F. Supp. 2d 644 (D.N.J. 1998).
153 Id. at 647.
154 Id. at 647, 649.
155 Id. at 654.
156 Id. at 646, 653–54.
157 These are the annual total revenues of IGT during 1983 and 1997 (in thousands):
$60,032 (1983), $73,262 (1984), $56,564 (1985), $41,574 (1986), $83,522 (1987), $98,694
(1988), $151,152 (1989), $210,257 (1990), $237,363 (1991), $399,443 (1992), $478,030
(1993), $674,461 (1994), $620,786 (1995), $733,452 (1996), $743,970 (1997).
See
INTERNATIONAL GAME TECHNOLOGY, ANNUAL REPORTS (1983–1993); INTERNATIONAL
GAME TECHNOLOGY; FORMS 10-K (1994–1997).
158 INTERNATIONAL GAME TECHNOLOGY, ANNUAL REPORT (1983).
159 INTERNATIONAL GAME TECHNOLOGY, Form 10-K (1997).
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Figure 2: IGT Annual Total Revenue: 1983-1997 (in thousands)
In 1997, following the constant increase in IGT annual total
revenues, it arguably reached a stage in its organizational life
cycle in which it had access to enough financial resources to
replace its exclusive distributor with an IGT-owned distribution
system. Predictably in that year, IGT decided to discontinue its
relationship with its exclusive distributor.160 Instead, IGT chose
to promote and sell its product on its own.161 At this stage the
reputation mechanism collapsed because IGT was no longer
interested in relying on distributors.162 Termination without
good cause was likely to occur. Indeed, IGT terminated its
distribution agreement with its exclusive distributor in 1998,
without any allegations of wrongdoing to justify the
termination.163 Rather, IGT praised the exclusive distributor’s
performance just prior to terminating the relationship.164 Good
cause supporting the contract termination was noticeably
absent.165
The collapse of the reputation mechanism is likewise
evidenced by the case of Day Distrib. Co. v. Nantucket Allserve,

160

Atlantic City Coin & Slot Serv. Co. v. IGT, 14 F. Supp. 2d 644, 658–59 (D.N.J.

161
162
163
164
165

Id. at 659.
Id. at 646.
Id. at 658–59.
Id. at 658.
Id.

1998).
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Inc..166 Nantucket Allserve, Inc. (Nantucket) produces a line of
upscale sodas known as Stewart’s.167 At the early stages of the
organizational life cycle of Nantucket, its resource availability
was apparently limited.168 One of Nantucket’s founders, Mr.
Scott, was so financially strapped that he slept in his car during
the summer of 1991.169 At that early stage, Nantucket sold its
products through distributors170 who provided financial resources
to Nantucket by purchasing high volumes of Nantucket sodas.171
Arguably, Nantucket chose such a marketing strategy due to its
financial inability to distribute its products on its own. At this
stage in Nantucket’s organizational life cycle, the reputation
mechanism was relatively effective. Nantucket had to rely on
distributors, and therefore was restrained from acting
opportunistically towards its distributors.172
Nantucket’s financial situation improved dramatically over
the years. Revenues soared from $200,000 in 1991 to about $30
million in 1996.173 In addition, the successful Nantucket group
was purchased in 2002 by Cadbury Schweppes Plc, a British
beverage giant,174 for an undisclosed sum that was estimated at
$100 million.175
Following the acquisition of Nantucket by Cadbury,
Nantucket presumably reached a stage in its organizational life
cycle in which it had enough financial resources to discontinue its
reliance on distributors and perform all the distribution functions
on its own. In fact, one year following the acquisition of
Nantucket by Cadbury, they both began exploring the possibility
of discontinuing distributors.176 Instead, Nantucket and Cadbury

166 Day Distrib. Co. v. Nantucket Allserve, Inc., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57334 (D.
Minn. July 25, 2008).
167 Id. at *1.
168 Robert Halasz, Company History: Nantucket Allserve, Inc., available at
http://www.answers.com/topic/nantucket-allserve-inc (last visited Nov. 1, 2009).
169 Id.
170 Day Distrib. Co., 2008 U.S. Dist. at *2. Two of the distributors began as subdistributors of Nantucket but later became distributors of Nantucket. Id.
171 Id. at *3.
172 Halasz, supra note 168.
173 Id. In 1996, Nantucket was ranked 13th in Inc’s fastest-growing U.S. private
company list. Id.
174 Corpfin Worldwide, Deal No. 171893 (June 19, 2009) (providing a summary of
Snapple Beverage Group’s acquisition of Nantucket Allserve Inc.). Notably, Cadbury
bought Nantucket through Snapple Beverage Group, a wholly-owned subsidiary of
Cadbury. Id.
175 Cadbury Schweppes PLC: Nantucket Nectars Purchase Will Build Snapple
Beverages, WALL ST. J., Mar. 26, 2002, at B.6.
176 Day Distrib. Co. 2008 U.S. Dist. at *5. Two clarifying notes: Firstly, Cadbury
Schweppes Americas Beverages, one of the defendants in the Nantucket case, was a
subsidiary division of Cadbury in the United States. Secondly, the court referred to
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decided to distribute Stewart’s directly rather than to rely on
distributors.177
At this stage, the reputation mechanism
collapsed and termination without good cause was likely to occur.
Unsurprisingly, Nantucket took its distribution operations inhouse and terminated the agreements with its distributors.178
Apparently, Nantucket did not terminate the agreement due to
the distributors’ failure to comply with their contractual
requirements.179 Good cause supporting a termination was
presumably absent.180
CONCLUSION
This article questioned the effectiveness of the reputation
mechanism in deterring opportunistic termination by
franchisors. It also cast doubt upon the traditional law-andeconomics assumption that reputation can be a substitute for
franchise termination laws.
While this article focuses on franchise relationships, its
conclusions can have broader implications. The assumption that
reputation can serve as a substitute for regulation of long-term
commercial relationships must be re-examined. As we have
demonstrated, the concern for one’s reputation in long-term
commercial relations often has a limited life cycle. A firm in the
early stages of its organizational life cycle usually lacks internal
financial resources needed to achieve its business goals;
therefore, it is spurred on to enter into contractual relationships
with other firms that can assist it in overcoming its financial
constraints.181
To illustrate, a financially immature firm,
wishing to erect a factory, may have an initial incentive to enter
into a partnership or a joint venture agreement with other firms,
in order to recruit necessary capital. At this stage the reputation
mechanism has some deterring effects, since the young firm is
economically dependent upon its contractual partners. However,
as the financial availability of the immature firm improves, it
becomes less dependent on its contractual partners. The firm’s

Nantucket Allserve and Cadbury Schweppes Americas Beverages as “Cadbury,” following
the practice of the parties. Id. at *1–2.
177 Id. at *5.
178 Id. at *1.
179 It seems unlikely that all distributors concurrently failed to comply with
Nantucket and Cadbury’s requirements.
180 For more cases which potentially reveal the collapse of the reputation mechanism
in the context of franchise termination laws see C. C. Hauff Hardware, Inc. v. Long Mfg.
Co., 148 N.W.2d 425 (Iowa 1967); Volvo Constr. Equip. N. Am., Inc. v. CLM Equip. Co.,
386 F.3d 581 (4th Cir. 2004); Sims Wholesale Co. v. Brown-Forman Corp., 468 S.E.2d 905
(Va. 1996); Cooper Distrib. Co. v. Amana Refrigeration, 63 F.3d 262 (3d Cir. 1995).
181 See supra Part II.A.
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incentive will shift towards owning and operating the business
on its own, which will increase its profits. At this inevitable
stage, the effectiveness of reputation in preventing opportunism
will decline and the reputation mechanism may ultimately
collapse.

